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INTRODUCTION
The maritime transports, although descended from a long 
history, particularly knew, on the exploitation plan well 
different shapes from those we observe today. These last date 
back to the apparition of the steamships' thchnic's propulsion.
For a very long time, the transports which were a big adven­
ture, have put down carried on rare and expensive goods, 
carried in small quantities. At first, it was oil, wine, 
spices, etc. Then it did not concern an isolated activity, 
it was an element of a total operation. At the same time the 
shipowner was the dealer; he bought a complete cargo, tried 
routing it to sea, going risks towards its destination's 
point and reselled the merchandise.
Discoveries have given a new impulse to the maritime trade. 
Successively then we saw becoming famous the P-ortuguese, 
Spanish,Dutch, and British merchantships.
But the beginning of their contemporary history may be - 
situated towards the period, on which England having made 
a free exchanger choice's, abolished the "Cromwell Shipping 
Act", which long since reserved the English trade to the 
British ships.  ^ It is from this resolution that follows its 
fleet's powerful ascending, which during the so called time 
of "free flow of shipping" had dominated the world maritime 
trade.
Prom this date, the technical improvement in the shipbuilding 
accelarated, and led an unprecedented progress of the mari­
time trade. On the request's side, the free exchange's adap­
tion deeply modifies the traffic's course .nature which doesnnot 
concern not only onerous and exceptional goods, but also 
becomes a real masstransfer, particularly of raw material 
and agricultural products.
l) Rodi'fere; "Sea-freedom and trade freedom", TGDM, 1976, p- ff
2Parallel, the great migratory movements, as well towards USA 
and Australia, as metropolis towards their African and Asian 
Colonies, supply an intense traffic of passengers and goods.
All offcthis leads to a rapid and deep evolution of maritime 
transport, which soon takes the aspect, that we know of them 
today, and requires from the international community to be 
taken charge of, in order to give them a sound aspect, on 
agreements and regulations' basis.
Taking account of their Specification's important costs, 
the shipowners were conscious of trying to regulate them on 
conferences' basis, according to their interests.
So, conferences are maritime transports' groups, practicing 
on a route determined by geographical limits, inside of which 
they operate with transports' conditions and common freights 
ensuring the given frequencies' respect. -
Rodiere defines them as a group of companies calling at a 
same route, on a same geographic zone, which because of 
agreements, perceive uniform freight rates.^
In similar way UNCTAD, in its 1970 report, describes them as
groups of companies exploiting groups on which because of
1fundamental agreements, perceive uniform freight rates.
For other definitions, it concerns private agreements between
shipowners, whose aim is to settle a common freight tariff and
2rationally regulate the traffic.
1) Rodi'fere; "The Code of Conduct of the maritime Conferences" 
JDI, 1978, p. 335
UNCTAD Doc TD/b/c4/62, 19 January 1970, on "the maritime 
Conferences' practices and maintenance of adequate maritime 
services"
2 ) Foyer; "The shipowners' Conferences", Rec, SD, 1965* P* 159
Moussu; "the Code of Conduct of the maritime Conferences" 
DPCI, 1975, P. 129
3Anyhow there it concerns nuances more than differences, and 
all of these definitions try, under a synthetic formula, to 
include a reality which at once is complex and varied. For 
trying to surround it nearer, it is possible to examine the 
Conferences under an institutional, functional, and juridical 
three-lighting.
Under the angle of institution, any conference, as beside any 
agreement, in the beginning rests on a Contract more or less 
formulated, and gives birth to a group itself, also more or 
less flexible, which can be composed of an association or a 
group relatively stable, with a secretariat and an administra­
tive organization, precise enough.
Under the functional aspect this time, the conferences repre­
sent very distinct advantages, and disadvantages according 
to the interested parties.
For the shipowners (members) it is beyond all question that 
they operate a traffic's regulation and more precisely a 
competition's control, allowing to anyone to benefit from a 
reasonable part of profits, at the same time having relatively 
moderate losses.^
On the other hand for the shippers, at least for the shippers 
customers, they present safety's advantages, relatively constant 
freight rates, and also the guarantee of vey important ser­
vices, and especially those the ports of which are generally
2badly called at, will be regularly Visited by the Conferences.
1) The industrialized countries' shipowners also pretend that 
the Conferences constitute an instrument, which takes into 
consideration the specific position of the third world's 
shippers. The entry into service of specialized ships, 
authorizes the exploitation of riches till shown in a favou­
rable light, as the promotional freight rate's fixing pri- 
viliges the exportation of developing countries' nontradi-
tiOnal products. See Moussu: "The New Dehli Conference and 
the maritime transports." AFDI, 1968, p. 6k2
2) The mentioned advantages recognized either in the practiceor in the texts.
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It is right that these last estimate sometimes that the
Conferences represent an alienation of their freedom and
sometimes want to escape from agreements and contracts,
which are concluded with the Conferences.^And this unfavou-
2rable point of view is shared by the outsiders, the inde­
pendent shipowners, who often would like to make them burst 
out. Recently the attacks came from developing countries^
3which saw in it a shackle to their national flag's expansion.
Finally on the legal side, we can notice that these Conferen­
ces' statutes are realtively nebulous. In that respect we can 
observe an opposition on principle at least between the private 
international law point's of view, which constitutes an inter­
national society's right, here of shipowners and shippers.
Although it is,' these Conferences appear as supra national 
groups which escape or try to escape from state's ascendancy. 
These last try to recover their influence by diverse measures, 
either by policy's law or by immediate applying law or .by 
international conventions.
But really, the Conference did not reach this physiognomy
kimmediatly. The have known a troubled and difficult history.
The first was created for the United Kingdom-Calcutta traffic 
in 1875» because the Suez Canal's opening in 1869 had provoked 
a very hand competition between shipowners; and the British who 
assured the traffic between the Western European ports and the 
Indian coasts, decided to end their rivalry and to propose a5common freight tarxff.
1) Rodiere; "Conferences* critical examination", TGDM, 1976,
p. 46 ff.
2) This category is also called outside Conferences, it means 
shipowners stranger to the group.
3) Many of these countries which actually give themselves a 
modern maritime legislation, want a national merchant marine 
(ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon ...) they think that the Con­
ferences block their development.
4) Foyer, ibid. p. 160
5) Rodibre, Foyer, Ibid.
5Then from I875 to I89O it was the full period of tentative 
effort and negotiation. The agreements between shipowners 
was nothing else in fact than armistices* signatures and 
applications in the traffics’ war that surrendered themselves, 
armistices often broken, but practically always negotiated 
again.
From 1890 to the first world war, the armistices' agreements
are going to leave the place at the organization of all the
big Conferences' system and their expansion was such that in
1913 we already could find again practically most of the
Contemporary Conferences. The North Atlantic German Conference,
which prefigured the greatest actual Conferences as by its
1power than its organization has been sfet since 1892.
The first world war occasioned the system's rupture until 
around 1920 where all the conferences before war were re­
constituted to which some were added as one goes along new 
traffics' contracts were developing.
During this period, conferences Golden Age, where the system 
growing more by new freight pools' implementation, was for 
all that disturbed from time to time by serious internal 
crisis, generally provoked by important members' tetreat, 
finding their rights inadequate, or by external events as 
the Pound Sterling's devaluation in 1931•
The second world war, as the first, lead to a conflict of
2all the Conferences.
The after war period is marked by a very fast reconstruction 
and the German and Japanese teturned in force, very important 
and practically are in all the conferences from 1953*
1) This Conference has been constituted for the first time in 
1892 and organized again in 1997* See Foyer, ibid.
2 ) Moussu, AFDI, 1979, P. 687
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Since ^960, they became stronger in all the fields, but we 
have also to recognize that the climate changed deeply.
At first the maritime technic was extremely transformed, 
particularly by the containers' technic arrival which actu­
ally became more and more important.
The competition also changed intensively on account of the 
newcomers' entry on the maritime market, especially ships, 
either flags of Convenience or developing countries, or 
Socialist States.
At last and above all, the political climate has changed in 
respect of States' constant intervention.
This is plotting in large draughts the maritime Conferences' 
history, that justifies so the heading of our firfet part:
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE MARITIME CONFERENCES
So it seems natural that the research of adequate solutions 
concerning the Conferences' phenomenons showed a trend towards 
international and legal instruments, which not only ensure 
some' non-discriminatory' s principles as regards shippers and 
competitor's guarantee between maritime companies, but 
specially allow the poursuit of general interest essential 
aims of states which shelter the principal ports of call 
served by the Conference.
Among the employed instruments with this end in view of the 
international practice, the most recent and the most developed 
is the Conference on the Code of Conduct of maritime Conferences 
aJ)proved in Geneva, of which we will see in detail the essen­
tial points in our second part.
TOWARDS AN INERNATIONAL SOLUTION OF MARITIME CONFERENCES?
The UNCTAD Code of Conduct
PART ONE
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION 
OF- THE
MARITIME CONFERENCES
Chapter I 8
THE MARITIME CONFERENCES SYSTEM
In order to deraythicise this notion of Conference and to 
clarify some problems, we will study:
- its internal functioning
- its contractual relations and the kind of agree­
ments getting knotted in such an organization
- its diverse activities.
But we have to note before that in all the Conferences, the 
common will is expressed by an Assembly having a general and 
deliberative power and which functioning is governed by the 
majority's principle.
In such an administration all the Conference's companies 
members are represented and each one following the statutes' 
habitual norms, conveys only one Vote independently of the 
volume of its traffic's part.
Generally the statutes forecast a President, sometimes ac­
companied by his board and who is almost always member of 
one shipping direction for which he continues working. He 
especially has functions of reprentation and convocation of 
the Conference and chairmanship of the agents.
Beside these functions some others are foreseen and attributed 
to the secretary-general who provides for the realization of 
the Assembly and the President's decisions, and for the daily 
administration, particularly looking after the board's direc­
tion, the other agents' work in preparation and the relations 
between members and third part.
Sometimes the secretariat's function is imparted by rotation 
to the companies^members and some other times it is framed in 
the Conference's structure. In both cases, one utilizes the 
companies members' staff or the Conference itself.
-iff
Often agents having preparatory and advisory activity mainly 
are instituted: they are the boaads and the committees. Studies 
and propositions' technical tasks on topics interesting the 
Conference are imparting to them, and particularly on the 
tariffs. Sometimes also control's assignments on the members 
are alloted to them.
Finally the financial funds of the Conferences' administration 
proceed from subsciptions payed by the shipping and divided 
according to perx:entages appointed in advance. They are either 
subscriptions corresponding exactly to expenses or equivalent 
to contractual subscriptions.
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Section 1
THE CONFERENCES INTERNAL FUNCTIONING
There is no conference type and no unique system. The obligati' 
tions contracted between the shipowners or by them as regards 
to the thirds differ from a conference to another.
There are Conferences which structure is very lax such as 
the freight agreements, some others which are strongly framed 
and have permanent and full administration.
Let us try dismounting the internal mechanism of these last 
which are the majority beginning to analyse their composition.
PI CONFERENCES COMPOSITION
A The Members^
Conferences are constituted of:
- full members with full rights as specified in the 
original statutes.
l) UNCTAD Doc TD/b/cV 62 19 January 1970
and affiliated members.
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A1 The full membership
There may be small differences among them in the way the 
frafic's rights spread to the zone covered by the Conference, 
or in contrary are limited by this or that member to some 
ports or other parts of this zone. Other limitations may also 
intervene on the voyages' number, yearly accomplished, or in 
the importance and the kind of tonnage liable to be transported.
The nature and the exact importance of the limitations applied 
to any full members share are defined in the Conference's 
internal agreement.
Amongst these full members there may also be some companies, 
who for soma reason or other (conflicts, war, Suez Canal 
closing for instance) stop their service on a given relation.
As far as they do ntit loose the rights obtained, under some 
reserves and maintain their right to vote notably. They are 
the non active members, often called "sleeping members" in 
contradiction to active members i.e. those ensuring a permanent 
and regular service.
A2 The Affiliated membership
or associated membership is granted to a company when it 
has only an occasional interest to a concerned traffic, or 
the Conference is unwilling immediatly to grant full member­
ship to a new entrant and prefers that it firstly shows its 
ability during a time, generally fixed in advance.
It is often for a Conference a convenient solution to invite an 
outsider or a company intending to open acservice between all 
or some of the countries it covers, to join it, in order to 
avoid an unpleseant or even dangerous competition, without 
granting it all the rights and benefits off full membership.
- 1 1 -
Generally the affiliated members can attend the Conference's 
meetings, but they have no right to vote.
Affiliated members as full members are subject to all the 
duties and obligations particularly in respect of the freight 
rates, the tariffs' general conditions and also the illicit 
paactices' prohibition.^
Nevertheless, they do not often pay any admission fee and 
their contribution to the Conference's expenses is also less 
than that of full, members and they are not called upon to pay 
a security deposition put up a good performance bond.
B Admission of new members
The highest characters of the Conferences' stahcture, are 
those bounded to the criteria for admission of companxes.
In that respect we remark on the ”two largest types of Con­
ferences:
- "Open" Conferences
- "Closed" Conferences
Closed conferences which are also the oldest, are those 
where the decision whether or not to admit a new line, rests 
exclusively with the existing members of the Conference 
concerned.
Generally these Conferences cover sufficiently protected 
traffics, either by their eccentricity, the particular condi­
tions of operation in the concerned ports, which require a 
long practice or a high efficiency specialization, or by 
the protection de facto the benefit from shippers or even 
states.
Open Conferences are those with every line having the inten­
tion and the ability to offer a regular linerservice in the 
conference's area of operation can join on application, subject
l) the list of the practices, generally considered as illicit
figures to the doc. air. indicated: TD/B/ch/6Z January -70
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to acceptance of the internaX conference agreement anc3 
the completion of any formalities, such as payment of admis- 
sio fee and security deposit, which are required.^
An example of open Conference is the one which operates in the
overseas trade of the United States of America, the Federal
Maritime Commission has directed that Conference agreements
shall contain a provision substantially as follow;
"Any Common Carrier by water which has been regularly 
engaged as a Common Carrier in the trade covered by this 
agreement., or who furnishes evidence of ability and inten­
tion in good faith to institute and •maintain such a Common 
Carrier service between ports within the scope of this 
agreement, and who evidences an ability and intention in 
good faith to abide by all the terms and conditions of 
this agreement may here after become a party to this 
agreement by affixing his signature t h e r e t o . "2
The admission to membership of any conference operating in 
the overseas trade of the USA can not be denied to any app­
licant exept for a "just and reasonable cause" and an advice 
of any denial of admission to membership together with a state­
ment of the reasons therefor^ has to be furnished promptly to 
the Federal Maritime Commission.
A Company seeking entry to a Conference has:
- first to make the request stipulating the nature of the 
service she wants to execute; information in respect of 
each vessel to be employed in the trade, whether it is 
owned, chartered or otherwise acquired, proposed frequency 
of service, contemplated loading and discharging ports 
and name of agents.
- to provide a sailing schedule, if possible. To inform 
the Conference of any forward Cargo Commitments made at 
rates or under terms and conditions at variance with the 
rates, terms and conditions prescribed by the Conference.
- Because the size of the tonnage is an important factor.
1) Doc TD/B/cV62/Rev. 1, p. 95
2) Cunningham: "The Administrative History of the Federal 
Maritime Commission Self Policing Rules", JMLC 1979, p. ^3 ff. 
p. 195 ff.
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tli6 company shouXd be in a position to accept the minimum 
service obligations, for instance to offer one sailing 
every month or every two months depending on the require­
ments of the trade, and should have enough vessels to 
pl3-ce in the Conference trade for this purpose.
The Company should have sufficient financial,and Commer­
cial standing and if possible to bring background 
experience of liner operation.
— Finally the Company is obliged to adhere to the sailing 
programmes as announced to handle cargo carefully, to 
be able to meet the shippers' claims for any damage to 
cargo, and to promtly refund deferred rebates which 
may be due to the shippers.
In principle. Conferences prefer an applicant to have owned 
tonnage rather than chartered tonnage, since•ownership of 
vessels is evidence of the intention of the apjalicant to 
provide a regular service on a long-term basis. In practice 
this condition is not rigidly insisted upon in every case, 
and there are instances where national liners have been 
initially admitted to the Conferences operating in their 
hometrades ah the basis of chartered vessels when the inten- 
"^ ion of ability of the line to own tonnage in the near future 
was evident.
¥e notice an evolution towards the formula of "Open Conferences" 
or in any case, towards a Conference where the shipowner who 
can present qualities of adequate services, has after a little 
while as outsider or affiliated member, been luck;^' en&ugh to’ be 
accepted.
The national shippings of developing countries meet with only 
few difficulties to get in a Conference as soon as they wish 
it.
1U
At last, those from Eastern countries more and more have the 
tendency to request and obtain their admission in the Conference 
and they behave inside as the most traditional and the most 
respectful participants of the regulations.
Section 2
THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS IN THE CONFERENCES REGIMES
The conferences' discipline regulates the traffic's distri­
bution between its Companies and fixes the tafiffs they 
undertake to practice to the shippers, specifies the quota 
of each member by the attribution of routes, number anH the 
voyages' calendar. Therefore we will start studying firstly!
- The internal agreements, which are the Conference's 
documents and constitute its basis.
- The statutes or memorandum of agreement and the inter- 
3^-1 regulation, which both ratify these internal agree­
ments.
- The formation and the communication of the Conferences 
decisions.
But often, the Conferences agreement creates a real inte­
gration of its members activities through the formation of 
pool. So it would be interesting to know:
- what is a pool?
- how it is organized
Pi THE INTERNAL AGREEMENTS
It is essentially agreements between members of a saime Con­
ference. They are intended to limit, may, to supress the 
competition between Companies members and to face up the out-
15
siders one.
They are sanctioned by:
Statutes, or memorandum of agreement, completed by 
an internal regulation constituting the Conferences 
agreements properly so called.
_ Eventually pool agreements.
It is internal and confidential documents, which before being
signed generally require long negotiations between shipowners.
On principle they are never communicated to shippers, nor even
to governments, except in some rare cases, as the Conference s
agreements ruling the USA external traffic (Traffic USA+-North
Africa, for instance) and considering as public documents and
2deposed beside the Federal Maritime Commission.
The scope and the duration of these agreements varry a lot, 
according to conferences and notably to competition* s risks 
between Companies members and that effective or potential 
between these last and the outsiders.
A The Statutes or Memorandum of Agreement
The statutes define:
The zone of activity covered by the Conference, i.e. 
the list of names of countries or ports called at, 
either to the loading or to the unl&ading, or both 
together.
The list of members with mention of their trade-name, 
their adress, and their status as full members or 
affiliated member.
The rights and obligations of members.
1) These Companies which are not engaged in the Contractual 
bouds surrender themselves to a severe fighttwith the Con­
ferences members. An evidence of this can be given by refering 
to the ''fighting ship" technic, a ship chartered by the 
Conferences Shipowners and carrying at loss goods in order
to exclude from the traffic any competition of independent 
shipping. However Article 18 of the Code of Conduct proscribes 
this practice.
2 ) Cunningham, ibid, and
Lowenfeld: "The Federal Maritime Commission and the Con­
ferences.", 1JMLC, 19 6 9> P« 21
- The modalities of admission, retreat, suspension 
or exclusion of a member.
The applicable penalties in case of infraction or 
violation of agreement by one of the members.
- The amount of the security or bank deposit ensuring 
the payment of these penalties.
- The way to regulate disputes between members.
- The way to settle disputes between conference and 
shippers.
- And the duration of the concerned agreement.
B The internal Regulation
It varies of course according to the Conferences. As an example 
there is a view of internal regulations of a Conference.
Firstly it defines the composition of the Conference and the 
rights of the fullmembers and affdliAted members.
Then it deals with its administration (role and power of the 
president, of Consultative Committees, its headquaters and 
official language), of the procedure concerning the meeting, 
the modalities of admission and resignation of members, the 
way decision are taken (method of vote, seeret of deliberation, 
diffusion of resolution) and finally with the procedures of 
modification of the regulation itself.
It is fitting to notice that Developing Countries give mqch 
attention to the creation of Local Committees, estimating 
that these understand better their national problems than the 
Companies' answerables having their headquaters in foreign 
countries.
These Committees are composed of the regional agents of shipping 
members of the Conference.
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They also are intermediary between them on one hand and the 
shippers and their local board on the other, as well as the 
Governments and the port authorities.
Yet their importance depends on the power of decision that 
the Conference delegates them or the importance she attaches 
to their recommendations.
6 Formation and Communication of the Conference 
decisions __________________________________
You should not believe that decisions come out by a magic 
from the minds of the Conference's Administration. Even there 
concerning minor problems, are subjet of consultations between 
shipowners, under the direction of the Secretary General of 
the Conference.
A proposition emanating either from shipping, or from the 
Conference's service will be a decision when she collects 
the majority provided by the regulation. The most important 
are taken during a deliberation of all the members and they 
are confidential.
If they are the subject of minutes, it is drawn up by the 
Secretary General under the President's control and it is 
only for the use of ]^articipants.
Once beingtaken, how are they communicated to shipping and 
customers?
The diffusion of decisions to the customers is made by letters 
or telex in the cas© of general problems, and eventually freight 
rates' modifications, if it interests the tariffication's 
matters.
In the Conferences' frame, generally these are specialized 
and permanent Committees, which elaborate before its holding, 
the documents on the basis on which the participants are 
working.
It concerns the tariffing Committees, Committees of managment, 
Control and Administration, Their studies end at propositions 
made to shipping.
P2 POOLING AGREEMENTS
Pooling can taJce various forms ranging from agreements to 
control the number of sailings of each pool member to a system 
in which the actual cargo carried or revenue earned by each 
member line is controlled.^
Let us see first what is a Pool?
A Definition of a Pool
Pooling agreements are regarded by the Conferences as "self 
imposed restrictions" agreed between member lines to provide 
the proper number of sailings to liandle the expected cargo 
movement.
The pooling system enables the Conferences;
- to eliminate wasteful competition for cargoes between 
the member lines.
- to obtain the optimum cargo for each vessel berthed.
- to provide adequate berth coverage to meet trades' 
requirement
- to cover the trade in a more economic manner and
- to maintain freight rates at a reasonable level.
A pool is subordinate or collateral to the Conference. In 
addition to the allocation of sailings^ the Conference lines 
may also pool cargo and, or revenue pool.
- A cargo pool usually relates to a specific commodity or 
group of commodities and under the pool each member is 
entitled to carry a specific percentage share of the freight 
tons of the items concerned carried by all members of the pool.
l) UNCTAD TD/b/cV 62 19 January 1970, "Conferences Practices 
and Adeguacy of shipping services"
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— In a Revenue Pool the total freight revenue of all the 
participants in the pool is shared according to agreed 
percentages. Usually the revenue paid into the pool is 
either a fixed percentage of total revenue or total revenue 
minus a fixed amount per ton carried.
In practice, in a majority of cases, the pooling arrangements 
cover both cargo and revenue. It is the combined cargo/revenue 
Pool which controls both the quantity of cargo carried and 
the revenue earned, so that each line has an obligation to 
lift a certain percentage of the cargo and to pay into the 
pool a ceriain proportion of the revenue arising from carrying 
cargo. The effects of overcarriage and undercarriage are then 
adjusted by the pool.
B Organization of a Pool
The basic document of a pool is the pool agreement} containing 
generally;
the list of participating members with headquaters 
and adress.
the nomenclature of traffic zone covered by the 
Pool.
~ a definition of the aim of this agreement.
In most of the cases. Pool arose from the necessity for 
conference members to eliminate cartain practices deriving 
from a competitive situation that the only Conference agree­
ments did not allow to avoid. For instance, inside a Con­
ference, the various companies can face each other for ob­
taining to their ships the richest or the easiest carrying 
cargoes, deserting voluntarily so called ’’poor goods”. The 
creation of a cargo or revenue of combined cargo/revenue Pool, 
puts an end to this rivalry and guarantees the transport of 
the less interesting goods.
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— A pool agreement excludes some goods the nature of which 
requires specialized equipments (refrigerated products, 
explosive minerais en vrac, bank notes ....)
— A pool agreement, and it is nearly the most important point, 
fixes the quote of every participant. The results bbtained 
in the 3 or h previous years of hhis creation by each com­
pany in the traffic he has opened, play a decisive role in 
the determination of these parts.
— A pool agreement also determines the procedures of the 
revenue pool abatement, its duration, the regulation of 
the surplus, deficits, the modalities of the admission^ 
of new members, the cases of.suspension, the arbitration 
procedures.
In corollary he always implicates the creation of a Committee 
so called of rationalization or of coordination,the principal aim 
of which is to organize all the departures of the pool mem­
bers according to circumstances and necessities of the traffic.
Seetion 3
THE CONFERENCES ACTIVITIES: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND 
THE SHIPPERS_____________________________________________
As groups of companies exploiting maritime routes, the Con­
ferences have very precise activities in order to organize 
and regulate the traffic which is realized under their care 
and on the itineraries they control. These activities are:
The fixing of the Conference tariffs 
The institution of loyalty arrangements.
PI THE CONFERENCE TARIFF
In any Conference the basic agreement between the members 
is to charge uniform rates. In order to effectively prevent 
rate competition between members, this is supplemented by 
rules, covering matters^such as calculation and collection
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of freight charges. The agreed rates and rules governing 
calculation of freight charges of a Conference are given in 
the Conference tariff. In working out the freight charges on 
any commodity between the ports served by the Conference the 
tariff is referred to the members of the Conference and their 
agents.
Conference tariff vary widely in size, and may further depend 
on the period for which the Conference has been operating on 
the route.
Conference rates are basically of two types;
class rate; is a rate related to a number, called 
a rating, which represents many commodities.
— Commodity rate; is a rate stated on a specific 
commodity of a particular description.
A Conference tariff consists of specific rates on various 
commodities. If a commodity is heterogeneous and the various 
varieties of the commodity have wide differences in their 
transportation chaaafcteristics^such as stowage, packing, 
value, then a series of rates are charged on the same commodity 
depending on the description of the particular variety of 
the commodity.
Normally in a Conference tariff, specific descriptions are 
provided for all commodities that move regularly and little 
cargo moves at the general cargo rate except new items. On 
the other hand, the tariffs of some Conferences have a rather 
limited list of specific rates, with the result that the 
general cargo rate in practice applies to a number of items. 
Since the scope of items that maybe charged the general cargo 
rate varies widely from one Conference to another, a coro“ 
parison of the general cargo rates in any two trades could 
be misleading.
Conference tariffs contain a classification of ports into 
• basic ports, other ports to which direct sailings are made, 
and ports served with transhipment. Regarding the classi­
fication of ports served by the Conference for the purpose
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of charging rates, k questions were asked to them;
1 How are the ports served by the Conference classi­
fied into basic ports and ports to be served direct 
with an additional charge?
2 What criteria are used to determine or change the 
above classification?
3 How are additional charges for direct ports which 
are not basic ports arrived at?
, 4 What minimum inducement of cargo per call on average i
considered necessary for a port to be given the 
status of a basic port?
In reply, 
a
b
c
d
the Conferences stated that:
The requirement of the trade, i. e. commercial 
importance of the port.
The volume and regularity of traffic passing through 
the port.
The port facilities, thb speed of turn-round.
The deviation involved, port charges, port conditions.
Additional charges for ports other than basic ports were 
arrived at.on the basis of the extra costs of a vessel's 
deviation from the main route and differences in cost of 
cargo handling, port expencses and time required to despatch 
a vessel between ports not of the same classification.
A Publication of the Conference tariff
There is a demand from shippers for copies of the Conference 
tariffs to be readily available, so that they can gromtly, 
provide rate information to overseas trading partners without 
having to inquire about the rate from one of the lines or 
the Conference secretariat.
On the other hand, the Conferences point out that reading 
the tariff is an intricate task. For example, some commodities 
have graded rates which vary with a'.^combination of factnrs^ 
such as value, stowage, and the physicalpr chemical properties 
of the cargo. If shippers.did.notread the rules and regulations
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governing the tariff accurately, tlbhey would work out the 
freight charges on a consignment wrongly.
They also point out that a Conference tariff is sometimes a 
very bulky and costly book and it would be a waste of time 
and money for a shipper interested in a single or a few 
commodities to take the trouble of maintaining his copy up 
to date.
A major objection of some of 'the Conferences to the publi­
cation of their tariffs may be that a published tariff is 
very easily available for existing or potential competing 
lines and that this could make way for a rate war.
Published freight tariffs give shippers an opportunity to 
make their own evaluation of the justification or otherwise 
of the rates on individual commodities.
It is observed that most Conferences are generally argeable 
to make a copy of its tariff available to the shippers who 
regularly ship cargo in the trade to which the tariffs apply. 
The Conferences are, however, disinclined to make available 
copies of tariffs covering trades in which the shippers have 
no direct interest.
The Conferences operating in the overseas trade of the USA 
are required under the Country’s legislation to file copies 
of their tariffs and amendments thereto ., with the Frederal 
Maritime Commission at least 30 days before the tariff or 
tariff amendment becames effective. They are also required 
to make arrangements to sell copies of their tariffs and 
any amendment that may be issued from time to time to all 
interested parties.
Clearly, the publication of the tariffbook is not inimical 
to the operation of Conference services.
B Stablity of freight rates
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One important claim made by Conferences is that they give 
to importers and exporters stability of freight rates which 
they believe will enable long-range planning of trade to 
take place, and protect the traders from the risks of sudden 
changes of one of the cost constituents.
- These claims are first, that they give such stability, second 
that this stability is in itself desirable, and third, an 
implicit that Conferences are the best way to give such 
stability.
The Conference argument on these points has been succinctly 
presented in the following terms:
” toc.abake fixed rates first, a merchant or exporter 
has a great many factors whiph influence his costing, 
such as labour cost, production cost, competitors prices: 
he does not want to add to these the danger of substantial 
variations in transport costs ... To meet this wide spread 
desire on the part of the shippers is one of the main 
reasons why cargo-carrying lines combine into Conferences 
and agree to quote the same rates and conditions for 
similar cargo to all shippers."!
It as also argued that the shippers have a preference for 
rate stability even if it is accompanied by a higher freight 
level as compared to tramp rates.
It is generallyheld by the liner Conferences that free compe­
tition in liner shipping is more likely to create instability 
in rates and that, the Conference, organization is necessary 
to provide rate stability.
Prima facie this seems logical, as in linershipping the fixed 
costs are a high proportion of the total cpsts of making any 
voyage.
l) "the shipper and the Conference system" published by the 
United Kingdom and Continent/india and Pakistan Conference, 
London, May I9 6 3, p. 5_8
As a Result, there is in the short run much scope for rate 
cutting in respect of individual items. Rate stability, 
therefore seems possible only if the lines enter into an 
agreement or understanding to charge uniform rates.
The preference of shipowners for rate stability arises because 
it apparently facilitates long—term investment planning. The 
operation of a liner service basically implies a long-term 
view of the trade on the port of the shipowners. Factors such 
as the difficulties of entering the trade, high investment 
employment of tonnage ... frequently make it difficult for 
a line to shift tonnage from one route to another. Possiwl 
bilities here vary and while some lines find tonnage—switching 
practically impossible, other see much more flexibility, in­
cluding the possibility of the use of chartered tonnage on 
occasions.
P2 LOYALTY ARRANGEMENTS
The purpose of loyalty arrangements is to ensure that all 
liner cargoes in the sjjhiare of operation of the Conference, 
the carriage of which the Conference members wish to reserve 
for themselves, are obtained by the members of the Conference, 
and that non—Conference competition does not exist at ports 
the Conference wishes to serve. Therefore, loyalty arrangements 
in one form or another exist in most of the trades covered by 
Conferences.
The three forms:of loyalty tie are the deferred rebatess-yfeteip, 
the dual rate system and the immediate rebate system.
Under the deferred rebate system, a shipper who utilizes 
exclusively the vessels of the member line of the Conference 
for carriage of cargoes between the ports covered by the 
Conference, and considered by the Conference as Conference 
ports for the purpose of assessing his loyalty to the Con­
ference, is entitled to receive a rebate of a certaxn per­
centage of his total freight pyamEJits. The rebate is computed 
for a designated pefiod . ("shipment period”) usually 3 to 6
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months, hut is pa.id after a period (''deferment period") of 
the same lenght foilowing the shipment period, on the condi­
tion that the shipper has given his exifciusive support to the 
Conference lines, both during the shipment period and the 
deferment period.
The points which the shipping Conferences generally advance 
in defence of the loyalty arrangements are:
1 They are necessary to enable the Conference to 
*naintaan a regular service at stable rates.
2 Shippers are not forced to accept loyalty arrange­
ments, and
3 They do not debar the entry of an outsider into 
the trade.
The Conferences maintain that in their operation of acservice 
there is essentially an acceptance of both favourable and un­
favourable conditions. Any Conference covers a wide ragge of 
ports with varying efficiency and wide differences in cargo 
movement, while the Conference vessels accept mixed cargoes 
with wide differences in direct costs and freight charges.
No shipper, it is argued, is compelled to patronize a Con­
ference since, barring the difference between the rates 
charged to loyal and non—loyal shippers there is no discir- 
mination between Ipyal shippers and others, for example, 
in the conditions of service.
The Conferences claim that the shippers accept loyalty ties 
of their own free will and that they are free to use both 
Conference lines' vessels and outsiders by paying higher 
net rates.
They also claim that the loyalty arrangements are not impreg­
nable in the sense that any outside line, which is not an 
occasional caller, but has the intention of operating a 
regular service, can break into the trade, is also not wholly 
true. To get a footing in a Conference trade where loyalty 
arrangements exist, an outsider line has not only to convince 
the Conference shippers of his ability to continue to charge
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Isss Conf'©reiics rate in the futurej but aiso to reimburse
the Conference shippers for the losses they would incur through 
either the loss of accumulated deferred rebates or through a 
legal claim for damages for violating the loyalty contract.
Chapter II 28
THE EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS TO THE CONFERENCE SYSTEM
The chill wind of liberalism following the second world war 
and the aspirations to freedom coming out in almost all the 
third world countries, not only in political field, but also 
in economical matters, have called in question again the 
maritime Conferences system.
In the private domain, shippers Councils took form and became 
the faithful interlocutors, although sometimes hard, of 
Conferences.
This resolution extrait adopted by the International Chamber 
of Commerce in July 19^1, is more over significant by suppor­
ting the Conferences system;
"Essentially in the international field, where the 
Conference system is exerted, it is a guarantee for 
users, and these would consider as prejudicial to trade 
and public interest, if unilateral and governmental 
regulations would arrive to destroy this system, not 
only to the detriment of the whole international traffic, 
but at the sacrifice also af the economy itself that 
such a legislation would have aimed to protect."1
In 1963 the European Ministers of Transport adopted a reso­
lution approving the functioning of the Conferences system, 
following what the European Conferences and European shippers 
councils decided to meet regularly in order to discuss 
Common interes^b questions and to try to regulate their disputes.
Moreover these disnussions have helped considerably to the
normalization of Conferences practices and a series of recom-
mendationshave been elaborated in a booklet jointly written
by the Committee of European National Shipowners' Association,
more commonly called C.E.N.S.A. and the European Shippers 
2Councils.
1) JMM, 1979, P. 3092
2 ) The booklet entitled "note d'entente" has been signed in 
London 21 October 1964 between the European and Japanese 
shipowners and European Shippers.
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After Tokyo's meeting in February 1971» the European and
Japanese Ministers, the C.E.N.S.A. in collaboration with
the European Shippers Councils, elaborated and diffused in
October 1971 a Code of Practice, which has since been adopted
1by a great number of Conferences, established in Europe.
In their turn, the highest international instances seized on 
the question, and UNCTAD instructed to study the maritime 
international.legislation problems, adopted in February 1971 » 
a resolution which tends to be the main question of the dp.y 
during its next works, the settlement of a Code of Practice 
for the Conferences or regular lines shipowners. (We will 
deal with these international interventions in our second 
part.)
But a dispute of the conference system will not be long 
to emerge. Its characteristic and^  some of its practices 
will be so violently denounced that it will end by evocating. 
the necessity of a "moralization" of Conferences on behalf 
of two morals;
- On behalf of the economic liberalism in order to 
control them strictly,
- On behalf of the aid to bring to developing countries 
so that the conducted action more and more shows
a trend towards a publicization of the institution.
Now we are going to study first these attacks comming from 
each side, before seeing the diverse and possible methods 
of regulation, because more and more under State control 
regulations appear.
l) On its preparation; UNCTAD TD/128, i4 December 1971 
JMLC, 1972-73, No. 4, p. 657
,
Section 1
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CRITICISM TO THE CONFERENCE SYSTEM
The Conferences functioning left to the free initiative of 
maritime companies, has been severely criticized so much that 
one could talk about instruments of a outworn and hateful 
imperialism.^
The most moderate of its detractors have underlined the exac­
ting character of the system, not only for the national 
economies of developing countries notably, but also for the 
shipowners themselves.
Truly several authors underlined that the organization's 
users did not have any real possibility to negotiate the 
tariffs which were unilaterally established by the Conferences, 
without reflecting in an appropriate manner the general aspect 
of freight market.
They<^also added that the loyalty agreements in fact deprived 
the shippers of any power of choice, that any competition 
between carriers calling at the same maritime route, could be 
excluded and finally that itineraries and means of trans­
portation were favoured independently of nationality and
2national planning's criterium.
At all times then. Conferences have been criticized, curiously 
as much by shipowners themselves. Governments, and as by 
developing countries and shipper above all.
PI THE SHIPOWNERS
Even if this seems paradoxical, sometimes shipowners feel
1) Moussu; "The New Dehli Conference", AFDI, p. 6hZ 
Zamora: "Rate Regulations in Ocean Transport: Developing 
Countries Confront the Liner Conferences" Cal. Law. Rev. 
1971, P. 1298 ff..
2 ) US Department of Justice, January 1977» "Study of the 
Regulated Ocean Shipping Industry"
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some bitterness towards the Conferences system. This is under­
stood easily, because if generally, they are protected from 
the competition's excesses, it is thanks to a discipline 
behaviour, which sometimes is felt in the individual level, 
as a braike to the expansion's ability or to the need of in­
dependence, especially when it concerns non-leader shipowners 
inside the Conference.
P2 THE GOVERNMENTS
Most often the governments feel these inernational organi­
zations encroach on their sovereignty.
It is a fact that, decisions as ports calling at or the i 
tariffs structure, have important effects on the external 
trade of their countries notably.
Moreover they are tought of as dfeterents to -the development 
of their national fleets, because holding by the Conferences 
rights, their own national shipowners can not exploit their 
sea-material as they would like.
P3 THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The complaints ordinarily made by shippers or governments 
against Conferences, take a particular prominence in develo­
ping Countries.
Indeed, their only functioning can not resolve the problems 
settled by the exigency to establish proper and balanced order 
of transports, which can take into acount all the inevitable 
consecfuences that a regulation of the maritime traffic produces 
in the frame of Commercial relations between industrialized 
States and developing Countries.
It is right to think that the increasing volume of traffic 
com±ng from these developing countries, does not correspond 
to a noticeable increase of their merchant marine tonnage.
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On the contrary, in terms of percentages refering to the
total trade, it has suffered an continious decline in' the
 ^ . 1 past sxx years.
The situation will have repercussions not only on their import, 
but also produces important secondary effects on the balance 
of political power and on their balance of payment.
In fact, the maritime transports Carriers require the payment 
in their national currency, or in any case in a "strong" cur­
rency, which is easily and advantageously convertible.
The lackof an effective national merchant fleet of the dis­
proportion of the existing one facing the commercial trade come 
to them by a very negative rubric of their balance of payment.
It is true that several industrialized countries are in the 
same situation, but it is also right that for them their 
maritime freights deficit is, in part, otherwise compensated 
completely by important articles which are lacking habitually 
in the balance of payment of Developing Countries
So we should not be too suprised if all these developing 
countries have tried to intervene by force against the Con­
ferences system, in order to try to settle a maritime traffic 
regulation, which is granted with their national.exigencies 
on one hand and on the other hand, have put forward the neces­
sity of an international and uniform regulation of Conferences 
in UNCTAD frame as the particularly favourable seat for the
solutions'of the problems of the international trade, and for" 3seizing their authorities as regards developed States.
1) UN Publication II C, New York 196?, P» 28?, "Creation and 
expansion of Developing Countries Merchant Marine"
2) UNCTAD Doc. 19 January 1970, ibid., "the effects of the 
Conferences system on the Control and the Politic of the 
third woild countries currency"
3) Haji; "UNCTAD and Shipping", Journal world Trade law, 1972, 
p. 582 ff.
p4 the shippers
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Their criticism can be called natural. The Conference often 
appears to them as the administration, which is opposed to 
the free commercial negotiations.
Until the years following the second world war and seen the 
extraordinary explosion of seatransportation, as on the eco­
nomical plan than the technological side, the shipper was 
more in touch with his shipowner than the Conferences, whose 
role was clearly morediscret. He found there the advantage of 
direct relations, could explain more well his particular 
needs for creating a new traffic or defending those already 
existing, even discussing an interpretation relating to 
tariffs which seemed unjustified to him.^
Then during the 1950s some of these Conferences have taken, 
for diverse reasons, an aspect more and more’exacting, parti­
cularly the increase of the size and then the cost of ships 
imposing financial, agreements, sometimes pooling arragements 
in wich the shipowners’see their personality breaking up.
In fact, the shippers being unable to be heard by shipowners 
interpretes with who they were in immediate relation, felt 
the necessity to get together in order to constitute an 
entity capable of obtaining a possibility of discussion i^fith 
the Conferences; it is from here shippers councils are issued.
Does that mean that shippers are^deliberately against the 
notion of Conference? Of course not.
They FiNd it has some advantages. (but, on the other hand), 
cooperation must settle, if one wants the legitimate need 
of the customers taken into account, which is the Conferences 
final aim, It is to assist it the best possible way.
1) UNCTAD Doc TD/b/c4/2D Rev. T, on:"Consultations and nego­
tiations between shippers and shipowners"
2 ) Same Doc: "Consultations on maritime transport, creation 
of shippers organizations on the national and regional 
plan”
- 3h -
In general shippers reproach the Conferences with too high 
freights that a serious competition can not bring down, and 
their monopolistic power which particularly is exerted on 
the tariffs structure and increase, but also on the services 
organization.
In order to satisfy their needs, they wish to find beside 
them, a commercial comprehension, a service's punctuality 
and rapidity and a safety in the execution.
The maritime Conferences nature and the members it regroups 
make the international Community sceptical as to the equitable 
and egalitarian distribution of the traffic, and to the non­
member exploiters . It is from thisi'point of view that the 
research of legislative measures aspiring to correct the 
functioning is necessary, hence the apparition of regulation 
measures of these Conferences.
Sefction 2
THE DIVERSE METHODS REGULATIN& THE MARITIME CONFERENCES
The various criticism formulated against the maritime Con­
ferences system, lead some countries to adopt an official 
or quasi-official regulation, in order to give them a new 
face and more credibility.
These measures do not answer to the situation&s exigencies 
as is testified by the number of complaints coming from mari­
time or non-maritime countries, about Conferences practices.
The proof is that the Conference of West European Countries, 
and Japan met in Tokyo in 1971 recognized that:
"The Conferences could not continue developing unilate­
rally their polities and practices unless the public 
powers give them some directives in the public interest 
and without a certain intervention of the authorities 
in case of coming difficulties."^
l) Ibid.
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The Conferences have an internatipnal activity and most of 
them countjamong their members Companies belonging to differ 
rent states. Therefore more unilateral and national regulation 
concerning them is satisfying.
The necessity of any international regulation's formula 
being recognized asserts itself. Then the problem is settled 
by choosing the appropriate type and the required mechanism, 
taking into account the general advantage of diverse! counts 
ries belonging to the activity's area of the Conference and 
conforming to practical and commercial considerations, unless 
provoking as far important jurisdiction's conflict between 
their national interests.
If we want to know if an international regulation would be 
preferable to a national regulation, we should also take 
into account an essential factor for developing countries, 
which by adopting a unilateral regulation risk to bring upon 
themselves reprisals measures on the part of Conferences or 
Governments, that would be prejudicial to their external 
trade, because manifestly they do not have the great Powers 
economical importance.
From this point of -view, any Conference system should be able 
to answer these principal criterias which are:
- to foresee a regulation of disputes as rapid as 
possible, taking into account their gravity.
- to settle an economical and simple procedure's 
regulation, as regards institutions and mecha­
nism, and available for all the parties.
- to adopt an impartial regulation so that all the 
parties are determined to accept the decisions.
There are diverse methods regulating Conferences in the 
public interest:
- regulation by legislature
by local and international arbitration
- by creating an international organization in charge 
of regulating them and ensuring the discipline.
PI THE CONFERENCES REGULATION BY LEGISLATURE
Such a regulation would necessitate a previous agreement between 
the interested parties to decide if the promulgated law would only 
apply to Conferences having their headquarters in the country 
where they would be adopted, or if they also should aim at those 
being somewhere else, but calling at ports and the traffic of 
States proposing to settle regulations.
Any proliferation of texts would risk to increase the conflicts 
of competence number and thenrto provoke contests of national 
interests
It would be possible that many countries consider the regulation 
of the Conferences activities, as partial to the interests of those 
who promulgated it to the detriment of the other States interests.
It is what would happen notably, when "the first have important ■ 
regular liner fleet.
Now only the USA have laws which unilateraly regulate Conferences, 
that created an outery of criticism on the part of developed count­
ries which maritime interests are menaced.
The multiplication of detailed national regulations putting down 
on the Conferences practice, doesn't seem bringing in the future, 
a satisfying solution to this problem.
P2 REGLUATION BY LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
It is a principle that the expenses and access facilities to a 
court of justice for lodging or contesting a complaint are propor­
tional to the importance of the problem.
Most of the complaints against the Conferences practices are essen- 
freight rates questions, inequitable clauses in loyalty 
agreements •••, and they do not have all the gravity or the neces­
sary character for being lodged in front of an international juris­
diction
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Then it would be a waste to start off an expensive international 
machine for judging less important disputes and which in most 
cases would be settled at less charges by more simple local arbit­
ration procedures.
In this fact one would be abel fo foresee:
- firstly the arbitration to the local level of rela­
tively less important litigations, about which it 
would be essential to hear the parties and immediatly 
to solve without waiting for.
the conflicts serious enough on Conferences politics 
and practices, and for which it would be more inte“es 
resting without .excessive slowness to end at an 
international regulation, being authoritative, 
than to find an immediate solution.
In most of legal systems, a loser has the right to introduce be­
fore a_.higher arbitral court or a cour't of appeal, for final decision.
Here the international arbitration would be definitive and there 
would be possibility of redress before a superior instancy.
Then it would be necessary to see that the arbitral sentences have 
binding power for the parties in contention,-
P3 CREATION OF. AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN CHARGE OF REGULATING 
THE CONFERENCES AND ENSURING THE DISCIPLINE__________________ _
It has been said durihg the third session of the Maritime Transports 
Committee that its actual structure would be changed if it would 
be conceived on I.A.T.A. pattern, which ulteriorly would replace 
the Conferences system by another method more conformable to the 
actual needs.^
Another similar solution although with less he^ -vy consequences, 
would fexist to institute an international organization entitled
l) I.A.T.A.: "Procedures and methods for users needs", JMM, 1978,
p. 192-193
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to regulate the freight rates and to impose to Conferenoea a dla- 
cipline.
The material problem which would not fail to rise if these augr 
geationa were kept ia the coat and the importance of the organi­
sation, the indiapenaable secretariat and its representation in 
principal ports, and commercial regions of the world.
A great number of Executive committees should be created for looking 
after all the questions relating to Conferences considering the 
I^rtipticitT Of their types ensuring the transportation of diverse
goods on different commercial routes of the world and o
everyone has its. own problems.
The competition from outsiderships ia also a factor which must be 
taken into account.
There is no precedent for backing up a theory according to which 
an organisation of this order would protect the shi,pera interests 
as it is advisable to do it. I.A.T.A. is a carriers association 
and any group looking aSter maritime activities and conceived on 
this model, probably would be constructed on the same way.
It would be also hard to make so that the interests of small 
countries and more particularly of non-maritime states be Protects
enough.
Then its impartiality would be subject to guarantee and for that
• T nowerful on the internatxonalreason its decisions would not be poweriux
level.
Section 3
REGULATIhk. RECENT EXPr.RIENCES AND CRITICISM
In a different way, the criticism we Just mentioned can not lead
to imagine that the Conferences selfregulation is able to give
^  A-P axrrpes with the Conferencesmore satisfying results, even xf it ag
headquaters states.
39 -
On that account the disappointing results of the Tokyo agree­
ment are revealing, where the Gonsultative Shipping Group 
(C.S.G.), of which the Ministers of Transport of Japan and 
west European Countries are members, accepted the most deve­
loped form of the Conferences self-regulation: the CENSA text.
Indeed, Tokyo agreement at first continued to be the expression 
of two waves on which historically the maritime Conferences 
are based, and for which their functioning today is firmly 
criticized: i.e. as we have already noticed it, on the one 
hand the principle of the contractual freedom, and on the 
other hand the principle of the freedom of seas and traffics, 
which allowed secrecy of Conferences and to exclude any judi­
cial or administrative control on their activities and decisions.
More over as a form of self-reguiation, the CENSA Code of 
Conduct, by placing in a prominent position the opposition 
of the maritime Committees to any- form of control on their 
action, is open to criticism.^
Particularly such a system seems insufficient being not as­
sociated to the use of concrete instruments able to ensure 
a control an the Conferences functioning, disengaged of deli­
berate fastening acts of shipping Companies.
The self-regulation of maritime traffics as proposed by CENSA 
either by the adopted solutions, or by the way they have been 
realized, although unfairly in some ways, seems to perpetuate 
the idea that the Conferences are organized so as to maintain 
the maritime market's monopoly in the hands of a limited group 
of shipowners in order to guarantee them maximum profits and 
to ensure the greatest advantage to the trade of the industria­
lized countries.
l) Farthing: "UNCTAD Code of Practice for the Regulations of 
Liner Conferences, another view", JMLC, 1973» P* ^67 ff. , 
in response to the positive Analysis of CENSA Code by
B Arlev: "UNCTAD Code of Practice for the Regulations of 
Liner Conferences", JMLC, 1972, p. 783 FF*
- 4o -
About these last criticism i3articularly, it is rightly noticed 
that the proposed self-regulation is not taken into account.
0n one hand,’here is the urgent political needs 
of economic planning manifested by some states lo 
being interested in the traffic mentioned by the 
Conferences.
- On the other hand there is the interests of shippers 
non arganized in shippers Councils, importers and 
consumers, who are completely excluded of any form 
of participation to Conferences decisions.
l) Particularly about the "shippers Councils role". UNCTAD 
29 November 1976, the "Effectiveness of shipper's organi­
zation" td/b/cVi5^
PART TWO
TOWARDS
OF
AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION
maritime' conferences?
THE UNCTAD CODE OF CONDUCT
Chapter I
MARITIME CONFERENCES IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF A CODE OF CONDUCT
Maritime Conferences are particular contracts,depending on a 
specific law, sometimes qualified as transnational.
They are agreements considered as regulating or restricting 
the competition according to shipowners' point of view on the 
one hand or shippers on the other hand.
Until recently the difficulties that have arisen, most of the 
time were regulated by Conferences decisions unilateraly.
At the present time, developing cotintries'shippers and ship­
owners organizations contest these practices and lay claim to 
an international regulation of maritime Conferences*conduct.
Still some developed States fearing the consequences of high 
freight rates on their economy than on their shippers organi­
zations regulated in the national frame the maritime Conferen­
ces activities being in touch with coasts.
The USA in i9 6 0, the Australia in 1966 and Thailand in I969 
attended to this question by promulgating laws.
Although the USA have an anti-trust legislation which is raising 
from their economical philosophy until 1958, the maritime 
Conference were not regulated in, because they were considered 
out of the Sherman Act as raising of foreign trade's activities.
But since the Supreme Court decided that the foreign trade 
fell under the influence of the Sherman Act, applying thereby 
the american legislation to maritime Conferences calling at 
this country.
For the USA any increasing tariff is not acceptable if it is 
not in the public interest as it is perceived by the American 
administration and Courts.
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For that reason the national regulation seems normal even 
For developed states, the more so as maritime transports 
between themselves are what is more important than in their 
relations with developing countries.^
At the political level it is them in UNCTAD who reguested 
for a code of conduct. Meanwhile among developed States, the 
USA have a very strong position towards maritime Conferences 
control.
So some apprehensions appear in the European Communities before
Great Britain’s entry reduced the acuteness of this problem,
the British shipowners feeling loathing for a strict regulation
of maritime Conferences, Until now Conferences were considered
in Communal Law as escaping to Article 85 of Roma Treaty for-
2bidding agreements.
Concerning the planned Code of Conduct, deep differences of 
conception appear between the concerned partie..s:
- shipowners in the CENSA project, propose a contrac­
tual and private system.
- on the contrary the 77 Group got from the UN General 
Assembly in 1972, the vote of a resolution 3035 
(XXVIl) recommending the adoption of a Code of 
Conduct by an international- convention.
In his lectures ,in the Academy of International Law in La 
Haye on ’’the Contemporary tendencies of International mari­
time Private Law” already presented the opposition in these 
terms:
"These projects (CENSA and developing countries) are 
distinguished essentialy by a different policy to the 
basis: The CENSA project is based on the selfregulation 
H  and the necessity to determine by Commercial Considerations 
without governmental intervenings.
lj MacGee: "Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American
Merchant Marine" 27» u.chi.1.Rev., i9 6 0, p. 191-31^
2 ) Thuillier: "Maritime Transports and Roma Treaty",
"Maritime Transports and Common Market", RTDL,
1972, p. 279 ff:
The Latin American;and Afro-Asian projects assuming the prin»- 
ciple that the Code should be formulated by the Governments 
and firstly dictated by political considerations."
The UNCTAD Secretary General evoked the possibility of a 
uniform and maritime legislation, every signatory state of 
the treaty undertaking to incorporate the dispositions of 
this in its national legislation.
The same opposition meets again at the level of disputes^ 
regulation, when a contractual and private Code opens on an 
arbitration of the same character, a convention calling in 
States, leads to the settlement of a more complex arbitration 
system.
¥e will see in details the problem of arbitration and conflicts 
inside the Conferences,' its consequences and respective pro­
positions of the 77 and developed States along our second 
chapter.
Because they constitute agreements limiting or eliminating 
the competition, the Conferences were the object of a public 
interventionism,particularly important.
Section 1
THE INCREASING WEIGHT OF STATES INTERVENTIONS
The maritime Conferences being in existence for almost a 
century and covering the world seas of a particularly dense 
system Are actually evaluated about 36O . Some eay even 400.
Really this number is very hard to evaluate since Conferences 
as any human arganization come up and disappear or combine 
and this goes on continiously.
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1) Doc TD/l04/Rev 1, ibid.
2 ) Acoording to UNCTAD Doc TD/b/C.4/Rev. After all it is very 
hard to know exactly their number, the given numbers varying 
from the simple to the triple and according to the authors.
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In any case, the right number doesn't matter; it shows the 
importance ofnshipowners confernnces representing today 60 
to 70 of the traffic and interesting all the world economies, 
whether it concerns liberal, developing or socialist economy 
countries.
This being admitted generally it is recognized that the Con­
ferences system plays a useful role by serving the international 
trade, but it is necessary to improve it, so as to make the 
unfair and discriminatory practices disappear and to conform 
it to the ne^ds and conditions of our present time.
Facing that, states rallied defending their interests and trying 
to regulate the Conferences activities so as to contain their 
action.
This work will be done within regional meetings and UNCTAD 
intervenibions in order to draw up a general code within uni­
versal reach.
PI THE DIFFERENT ATTEMPTS OF STATES
One assists at a succession of thoughts^ positions and nego­
tiations as from Governments, western States, shippers and ship­
owners than developing countries.
A The Bonner Law
It is taken for grantdd that 19^1 was the starting point where 
the diverse vicissitudes of the Bonner Law^ enforced in United 
States allowed many to awake to the consciousness of the Con­
ferences vulnerability.
In 1958 an American shipping line not belonging to any Con­
ference, got from the US Supreme Court a judgment notifying
1) The BhipownerAsnname, who launched the problem.
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unlawful the double rate's system used by a Conference.
Facing the gravity of such a sentence, the US Congress decided 
a more elaborate scfiptdy of the problem resulting in the pro­
mulgation of the very famous Bonner Law of 30 October I96I, 
that caused considesEeable stir and changed Conferences into 
simple consortiums controled by the Federal Maritime Commission.
Indeed according to this law, =fehe highest powers are attributed 
to the FMC allowing her to exercise a very precise control on 
Conferences, particularly requiring informations on freight 
rate's fixing that shipowners are not determined to give 
spontaneously. Thereby any contract shq did not authorize was
taken as unlawful and entailed a penalty of one thousand dollars
^ 2 a day.
This Bonner Law caused storms in the years I96I to 1964 and
3European Shipowners strongly suppfbrted by their states^ '^  
vigorously reacted in particular to this last exigency that 
they considered as contrary to the regulations of the Inter­
national Law and to the secret of affairs.
However it seems curiously that since 1964-1965 its application 
has not caused very big troubles. "A modus vivendi" has been 
reached in OECD's frame^ in 1964 and it appears that European 
Shipowners made with this legislation.
1) USA Supreme Court, 19 May 1958, FMC v. Isbrandtsen Co,
356 U.S.481 (1958) U.ch.l.Rev. I960
2) Cumningham: "the US measures for their Merchant Marine and 
the consequences on the future of maritime transports",
AFDI, 1964, p. 689 ff**
3) For instance France by Law no. 68678 of 26 SEuly 1968. Jo 
27 July .1968 prohibits"any physical person of French 
nationality ... to report ... to foreign public authorities 
about documents or informations relating to sea transport ... 
These documents and informations are those the communication 
of which to a foreign authority would be contrary to the 
regulations of the International Law or Violate France sovereignty.
4) The l4 States members + Japan. See Annual report of OECD 
maritime transports Committee, OECD, 1964, Paris, September
1965
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Yet the dangers was not set aside completely. Recently at the 
time of the devaluation of the dollar, the FMC intervened once 
more in trying to control the tariffs increases made by the 
shipowner's Conferences.
To remark also that this American administrative control was 
particularly criticized by European and Japanese shipowners, 
who fearing that it could be contagious and inspire countries 
against Conferences, especially developing countries, with a 
strict legislation.
Well, curiously one finds that up to now this bad example has 
not been followed. This howeveredoesn't mean that these countries 
did not intervene towards Conferences. They have done it in a 
more indirect way, specially by confering important subsidies 
for developing their fleets, and by adding the flag of Con­
venience system to their national fleet.
So for instance, same of these countries, such, as Ceylon and 
Malaysia, under diverse forms and not without some interest 
to themselves decided that their national fleet will have the 
transport's monopoly on 30 or kO % of the traffic which is 
considerable.^
In a 'way, these practices in turn were projected on the inter­
national level and that seems at the present time the most
critical point of the evolution of the shipowners Conferences.
{
The diverse worries inspiring a certain awaking to the con­
sciousness of an unavoidable competition from some otherscount- 
ries than Europe, USA, and Japan as well as an irreversible 
evolution have this consequence that in October 1971 a plenary 
session of European and Japanese shipowners and shippers drew 
up a Code of Conduct of Maritime Conferences, called C^E.N.S.A. 
Code, which will be transmitted to governments as the expression 
of the agreed position by shipowners and shipper's Councils.
l)Ceylon F.I. says that its companies should have the preference 
compared with any other ship for the transport of goods from cinghalese headliner ports: JMM, 1972, p. 461
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So how does this Code appear elaborated and adopted by industra- 
lieed states intervening in Conferences?
B Developed States and the C.E.N.S.A. Code
After Tokyo's meeting, the European and Japanese Ministers of 
Transport decided to invite shipowners to bring into focus 
some works of discussion and arbitration for settling disputes 
between members and for allowing shippers to treat with ConfeT? 
rences in order to find a solution to all problems they may 
have.^
The Shipowners understood that governments prefered not to 
intervene but were ready to do it in case of the Conferences’ 
inefficiency.
It was then absolutely necessary that the professionals get 
organized, be united and find the'way for settling the tech­
nics of dialogue as suggested by Ministries in one resolution, 
and this case was at the origin of the CENSA in 19^3 and conse­
quently of shippers associations in different countries.
2In July 1963 the national associations of 12 countries created 
the Committee of European National Shipowners Associations 
(CENSA) which in cooperation with shippers councils elaborated 
and diffused on the lAt.rCctdber 1971 a Code of practice based 
on the Self ReguAation's principle.
The main points of the Code concern:
- the participation of shipping to the Conference with the 
possibility of consulting shippers organizations ^hich 
wanted to come in either at the shipping's request or at 
the Conference's initiative and in case of disagreement 
one party or the other can call upon a Conciliator's 
shipping group, headed by a shipowner non directly involved
1) Informations on the differents measures taken by countries 
members in Tokyo: JMM, 1977» p.\1l62, 1164
2) They are: Belgiiam, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, 
Greece, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Swdden.
Later Spain joined the group.
in the concerned traffic.
-  49  -
- the organization and the administration with a new and 
important point: Conferences should annually publish a 
report of their activities.
- On the financial side shipping should present to accoun- 
 ^ting organizations all the information relating to their
costs and receipts for the executed services in the Con­
ference's zone.
- Finally some conciliation's procedures are foreseen in 
case of disagreement between shipowners and shippers.
After some modifications in Hamburg in 1973 this Code which 
does not implicate governements' intervention, received the 
approval of European shippers.
The policy lead by the Afro-Asian and Latin American groups 
in UN1DTAD level is still more interesting.
P2 THE INTERVENTIONS OF THE GROUP OF 77
The arrival of developing countries on the political scene 
showed the importance of the problem of maritime Conferences.
Indeed in the Committee of Maritime Transports, created to 
UNCTAD in 1964, they had underlined the impottance of this 
sector in their trade and balance of payment, and in Lima they 
had manifested their adherence to a fast and deep reform of 
maritime transports:
"It is in the maritime transports' field that appears the 
most scandalous injustice. It is governed by a real dicta­
torship, a monopoly where rich countries impose regulations 
as they please while the third world is concerned in it in vital ways."!
l) The discourse of Madagascar Representative - UNCTAD Conf. 
Lima, Peru
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Xti the Alger meeting in October 1967» they decided to adopt 
in short-dated several of action in applying the following 
principles:
- to recognize to their national companies the right 
to adhere on an equal basis to Conferences and simi­
lar organizations calling at the international trade.
- to adopt a promotional freight system because that 
applied on the goods coming from their countries is 
general^ high and often apposes the development of 
their exportations, especially in the periodiof fall 
in primary products.
So the offensive has been launched at the time of UNCTAD II, 
held in Santiago, Chile in 1973» when the 77 proposed a project 
of conferences' Code of Conduct, which project supposing an 
intervention of states, a strict arbitration and very precise 
clauses.^
The General Assembly rejected the most radical- claims. The 
Group non the less continued re-affirming its will for making 
a Code of Conduct adopt and obtained a meeting of a diplomatic 
Conference in order to regulate this question.
After the meeting of a preliminary Committee in January and 
JdnB 1973 and a first plenary session in November 1973> the 
diplomatic Conference with, of course, the support of deve­
loping and socialist countries, and in spite of the opposition 
of developed States'^  adopted on the 6 April 197^ in. Geneva a 
Code of Conduct which becomes essentially what its aim was; 
a going shares agreement; kO-hO-2.0, that is to say that in 
any signatory country cargoes should be shared in that way;
40 ^ for each of trading partners and 20 for the thirds.
1) Project of resolution presented by El Salvador in the name 
of the States members of the 77 Group; JMM, 1980, p. 222
2) becoming 19 since, could not fight with the other 77, al­
though they control the Maritime Market.
3) ms from Art 2 of the Code. For instance the traffic France- 
-Senegal will be ensured for 40 ^ by the French Flag, for 
kO io by the Senegalese Flag and for 20 °/o by all the others.
By instituting this 4o/4o/20 system, then the Code substitutes
to the free flags of shipping principle that of cargo sharing.
5l
However this convention for a 6ode of conduct did not come 
immediatly into force.Art 49 of the text so defines its app­
lication:
"the present convention will be in force six months after 
the date of which 24 States at least which global tonnage 
represents at least 25 io of the world tonnage would become 
contrafctual parties to the afore said convention."
If' the beginning 44 States have deposited their instruments
1of ratification , their liner fleet only represents about 21 
of the world tonnage. Therefore during the fifth UNCTAD in 
Manilla in 1979» the group of 77 urged to adopt a resolution 
inviting:
"the Governements of member states of UNCTAD which are
not party to the Convention, to join it and to take into
account the interest that developing countries have with2regards to this code."
This text indeed should take affect since countries represen­
ting 25 io of the world liner tonnage at least .would ratify 
it.
The ratification by one of any big country of EEC will go 
beyond She 25 °/o. The legislative process is already far ad­
vanced in England, Germany, Holland and other EEC Countries.
According to the experts this doorstep of 25 will be reached 
during the second trimester of 1983 or at the latest in the 
first monihs of 1984. From that time, the Code will officially 
come into force. Finally the Code became into force in October
1 9 8 3 .
The victory of the Group of 77 is not complete because the 
Code realized a compromise on some points. Therefore it would 
interesting to see up to where its application spreads.
1) jMM, 1978, p. 421: "the list of countries which have defini'tr 
iively signed, ratified or adhered to the Convention.
2) TD/L.163. 30 May 1979
Also see the appeal for promoting the process of application
"the code of Lamine Fadika, Xvoiry Coast, Minister of Shipping.
jL
Section 2
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THE UNCTAD CODE OF CONDUCT
The philosophy which understands the whole text, aims at 
organizing the maritime traffic of regular liners, institutio­
nalizing Conferences practices on the whole in a favourable 
light for developing countries as the preamble of the Convention 
shows if:
"Taking into account needs and problems appropriate to 
developing countries on the level of maritime Conferences 
activities which ensure their external trade.
First the Convention on the Code of Conduct considered how 
maritime companies will participate in Conferences and how to 
share the traffic between them.
In that respect it is prescribed 'that Conferences normally 
should be "opened" even if a different regulation can be plan­
ned between companies members depending on their nationality 
which will be determined on the basis of 3 elements:
- their head office
- the locality where their effective control is exe­
cuted
- the fact that their nationality is recognized by the 
authorities of the concerned country or by its 
legislation.
Concerning "national companies", they have the right to parti­
cipate in the traffic of their countries on the basis of a 
simple request and of the only verification of their capacity 
and intention to ensure the service of which they want to co­
operate
1) see text of the Code of Conduct: UN Plenipotentiaries Con­ference on a code of conduct, vol. 2
Moussu: "The historic code of maritime Conferences and its application." JMM, 1981, p. 2521-2528
2) First Art. Parag. 2
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In return, concerning carriers belonging to third states in 
relation with those who are called at by Conferences, their 
admission is subordinated to the exam of:
- the volume of the traffic of carriers member of the 
conference and of its developments.
the available space on board ships that the conferen­
ce^ own already.
- the effects that the admission of third carriers 
might have on the efficiency and the quality of the 
service provided by conference's decision.
Concerning the State's power of inspection and control on the 
Conferences functioning, it is foreseen that it will be rea­
lized indirectly and directly, especially through companies 
being under its control.
These last indeed, have the possibility to participate in 
Conference with both the right of" veto^ and the power of deter­
mining the step about decisions on the traffic., of their countries 
by origin, and generally about decisions on which the Conferen­
ces ' aagreement foresees the unanimity of companies members.
On the other hand, the national authorities in order to be 
able to exercise their functions and competencies immediately, 
should be well informed and shoulddgive their opinion especial­
ly on the admission of a new company and on all the questions 
concerning ifehe traffic of their country, intervening if neces­
sary in the obligatory consultations between Conferences and 
shippers.
This kind of interventions in accentuating the role of the
State will give some rigidity to the Conferences' system which
for that reason, will be able to reinforce rather than reducing
2the weight of outsiders and consequently claim protective 
measures taken by the states themselves. Nevertheless all of
1) by Art 3 of UNCTAD Convention
2) This is just confirmed by the decision.' of some maritime com­
panies to leave the continental North Atlantic West Bound
, Freight Confereiice and Far East other Conferences inorder to 
operate in as outsiders.
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this is the price for the transition from the free market 
economy to a controled economy which necessitates a direct 
participation of states in the maritime traffic.
Finally the last part of the UNCTAD Code is entirely devoted 
to the regulation of conflicts relating to its application.
These conflicts can of course happen either between carriers 
belonging to the same Conference, between two or severeal 
Conferences, or between a Conference and shippers.
In this respect, it is well known that very divergent positions 
have always existed between developing countries and industri- 
lized states.
While the former applied pressure to make the regulation an 
obligatory procedure of arbitration with an active legislation 
recognized by the national authoi^ities of the interested states, 
the latter recognized only consultative or conciliatory pro­
cedures in order to end an eventual agreements about different 
evaluations or at the formulation of recommendations which in 
any case would not be imperative.
The Convention is limited to foresee an autonomous and essen­
tially conciliatory process for very important conflicts in 
which the governmental organs can merely intervene in a margi­
nal way by entrusting to national and competent authorities, 
minor disputes arising among carriers belonging to the same 
national group.^
In this way the position of industrialized countries has finally 
been fully subscribed, but in preserving some regulations of 
the arbitration procedure propo,sed at first by the Group of 77 •
l) The dispute settlement machinery based on the consiliation 
is original and interesting, see;
Shah; "The dispute settlement machinery in the Convention 
of a code of conduct for liner conferences", 7> JMLC, 1975» 
p. 127
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But certainly it can not be these residual elements to which 
can be added the existence of an organization's structure very 
closed to those foreseen for the constitution of an arbitra-^ 
tion's body, which can denature the type of procedure foreseen 
in the Conventions as we have already observed it, this stays 
oriented to an exelusively type of conciliative procedure.
So being an instrument to the service of development, the 
Code represents an hybrid compound combining the will of a 
public organization of the maritime transport and the will of 
a public organization of the maritime transport and the will 
of maintaining institutions essentially turned towards the 
research of profits and profitability.
Chapter II
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MARITIME CONFERENCE AND TECHNICS OF ARBITRATION
While traditionally^Conferences brought private persons into 
contact exclusively, the originality of the project depended 
on the introduction of interested States in the process of 
^fjiegotiating freight rates, and eventually in the regulation 
of disputes, with a convention being able to foresee as well 
an arbitration between States than a "mixed" arbitration being 
added to the habitual Private Law Arbitration.^
There is no doubt of a possibility of an understate control 
arbitration. Since a State would reproach a Conference for 
not respecting the Code of Conduct, other signatory countries 
of the Convention would be able to be of an apposed opinion, 
make their national shipowners or shippers benefit by the 
diplomatic protection and ask foif the arbitration as regards 
to the other government.
We can wonder in the case of a mixed arbitration opposing a 
state to a Conference, if this ±n order to be able to litigate 
should not see its structures precised and acquire a juridical 
personality which all Conferences don’t have.
Moreover the possibility of the diplomatic protection, the 
implementation of a Code of Conduct will lead to other problems
Pof International Public Law.
Generally, Public Law is also alerted because of the role 
attributed to States.
It is-noticed that in the Code's project of the 77, 28 para­
graphs mentioned governments, 2 left it up to them to take
1) Rodiere: "Arbitration inside conferences", TGDM, 1976, p. ^73
Robert; "The arbitration according to the international 
Private Law.", Dal. 1967, p. 339
2) Especially problems of International Economic law,
A Colin, p. 8 and spec. 24 ff. see
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any action, 15 sought their participation and 11 of them refered 
to the national legislation or regulation.
On the contrary in the CENSA Code which reflects the tendency 
of developed countries the word "Government" is used only once.
Besides we fihouidyfirstly examine the rule of the norms of the 
International Public Law, before studying the problem raised 
by the nature and the application of the arbitration.
Section 1
CODE OF CONDUCT AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW
Will the Code of Conduct express directives that the interested 
parties will have to follow, conserving at the same time some 
freedom,of appreciation in their implementation, or on the 
contrary constrained regulations dn all their elements?
Then the problem is not reduced at all to a choice in the , 
formal plan between a recommendation included for instance in 
a UNCTAD resolution, and a treaty.
From the material point of view, it is considered that even 
in a treaty, the code can have only a directive's value if 
the signatories don't want to promulgate detailed and precised 
norms.
In the formal plan an obligatory treaty as it is, can have 
only a material content, limited to directives at least in 
that case it offers a superiority on the simple resolution 
because states bounded by such a treaty would be obliged to 
hold in respect by conferences concerning them some behaviour 
even if the norms define it with only some vagueness.
l)'This is noted by the representant of the Federal Republic 
of Germany during the F^ourth Committee of UNCTAD III and 
who maintained that the role of Governments should be limi­
ted: Doc TD/1 1 l/C.VSR.6.
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To know if a convention was the most appropriate instrument 
for the implementation of the Code of Conduct was often evoked 
during the first session,pf the Preparatory Committee in January 
1973 in Geneva.
Many industrialized countries indeed considered that the ela­
boration of such a code would be long and lay down bigger 
difficulties than a code not being obligatory.
Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the resolution 3035 establishing the 
mandate . of this preparatory Committee propose to adopt:
"a Convention or any other multilateral instrument being 
obligatory relating to a code of conduct of maritime 
Conferences."
The preparation of a treaty on the basis of the resolution 3035 
is also reinforced by a report of the International Law Committee 
enclosing a commentary relating to the projects of articles
on the right of treaties realized by the aforesaid Committee in
■1966.
On the material plan then, if follows from the eventual adoption 
of a treaty a necessary elimination of dispositions which make 
reference to the national law of the country of origin or the 
country of destination.
But the Art 58I of the text proposed by the working Group II 
of the preparatory Committee of the UN Conferences for a Code 
of Conduct doesn't seem resolving it and declares:
"If consultations end at an agreement, this will be 
communicated to be examined by the government of the 
country from where the cargo issues if the regulation 
of the aforesaid country requires it."
1) TD/CODE/PC/WGII/L.3/Add.k
4
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It is necessary to choose between national legislation and 
international regulation.
There is acrimony between these two approches;^developing 
countries wish to benefit both by a recourse to the interna­
tional regulation and by the protection that their own laws 
offer them.
The competition of the national legislation and the interna­
tional arbitration would allow states to elaborate laws oppo­
sing to the application of sentences.
In fact some developed countries noticed that if any arbitral 
decision was liable to the legislation of the country in case 
of competition, the same dispute would be able to be submitted 
from that time to the international arbitration in a state, 
but not in another. This clause then would correspond to a 
general and unacceptable reserve."*
This fundamental divergence between developed states and the 
Group of 77 find it natural prolongation intthe conceptions 
of some and others as regards arbitration.
Section 2
THE PROBLEMS SET BY THE NATURE OF THE ESTABLISHING ARBITRATION
The arbitration can be foreseen by a treaty which as we have 
seen it will be normative or indicative and including obliga­
tions for the Conferences and the States.
Will the choice between these two types of treaties implicate 
the consequences on the kind of arbitration foreseen in the 
Code: understate control arbitration or "mixed" arbitration? 
(State-Conference)
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1. If the treaty is indicative; the arbitration between states 
seems logical, as a right of directives leaves them some 
freedom of action as regards to maritime Conferences,
Thereby they can have towards these some exigencies con­
sidered by their partners as going beyond the previsions 
of the Treaty; a conflict follows with the others signa­
tories worried about, protecting their nationals and the 
recourse to the understate control arbitration.
Yet even in this hypothesis of indicative treaty, we can 
conceive that states agree to refer their conflicts with 
the maritime conferences to the*"mixed" arbitration.
2. If the tyeaty js normative; the mixed arbitration will 
become the most frequent procedure while this between 
states would be more exceptional.
The primacy of this kind of arbitration e.xplains itself 
because in fact the State importer is generally the prin­
cipal closely concerned to the maritime Conference.
Nevertheless if this is most frequent in developed States, 
developing Countries have essentially at the present time 
shippersS interests and can be into conflict with Conferen­
ces .
.i. On the other hand these countries wishing to develop their 
shipping in order to carry a more important part of the 
products they are exporting, can be opposed to some limi- 
tativa practices of maritime Conferences.
Rehlly the analysis of the attitude of these two types of 
states as regards to the arbitration is complex enough and is 
not reduced to the distinction between an indicative treaty 
as wished by industrialized countries, and a normative treaty 
as recommended by the Group of 77*
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The former in this particular case feel loathing for an arbi­
tration of Public Law and especially for any kind of institu­
tionalization of this procedure. They prefer a contractual 
arbitration between professionals.
Developing countries on contrary desire an institutionalized 
arbitration perfectly defined in the Code, leaving any possi­
bility to Governments for interfering in it.
So it will be conceived that these 2 types of states exercise 
different pressures on the Conference. The result may be a 
recourse to a international multiple arbitration, i.e. facing 
more than 2 litigants; 2 states and the maritime Conference 
for instance.
A scheme of an arbitral institution can from that time be 
proposed, that has been done by the Group of 77* We will examine 
it now by studying its application and then'the recourse to 
more political than juridical norms.
PI PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF ARBITRATION, PROPOSED BY THE 
GROUP OF 77______________________________________
A The application of Arbitration
The arbitration can be conceived in different ways;
- The CENSA Project presents a commercial arbitration 
regulating disputes relating to an interpretation 
of a contract or an agreement.
- The Group of 77 Project spreads out this scope and 
can affect for instance the fixing of freight rates.^
So it doesn't only concern a juridical arbitration, anymore, 
what on the technical plan would not surprise in the frame work c 
of world economical law, which lifts up^not problems of a 
strict application of the legality, but problems of wide inter-
l) see Ref. al. cit. concerning these 2 projects
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pretations supposing large powers for the judge or the arbit-- 
ration.
Hence it may be asked whether there is not some contradiction 
to the Group of 77» as on the one hand they request for a 
vigorous regulation included in a normative treaty and on the 
other hand they understand to recognize to the arbitrator large 
powers of appreciation, taking especially into account the 
particular needs of developing countries for the fixing of 
freight rates.
One of the industrialized countries, Germany, in the present 
case attracted the attention that the arbitration generally 
concerned previous facts, while in the Group of 77 Code it 
might concern many points refering to a future conduct, topic 
being generally within the competence of the legislative power 
or the administrations.
For this country a large arbitration for that reason would 
include at the same time the legislative activity and 
the jurisdictional activity, what would create practical dif­
ficulties, especially when there is more than two parties.^
B The recourse to more Bolitical than juridical Norms
The conceptions of some developed countries which have envisaged 
a code of conduct, especially during Tokyo meeting in 1971» 
are founded on the traditional basis and foresee only a regu­
lation of the Conferences activities.
In return the Group of 77 project of code should be perceived 
as one of the application of the UNCTAD philosophy.
Resolution 3035 of the General Assembly which delimited the 
task of the preparatory committee specifies that the code
li
1) TD/CODE/I and CODE/PC/5, p. 85
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"should fully take into account the needs and the 
difficulties characterising developing countries."
So the Group of 77 Project sticks to break up the strict juri­
dical and formal equality in the name of the real and econo­
mical inequality.
In order to locate the originality of this claim, it can be 
compared with a disposition of the European Community Laws, 
the Art 85, Parag. 3 of ^he Roma Treaty which foresees that 
can be validated the agteements contributing to the economical 
improvement on condition to attribute to the users an upright 
part of the realized profit.^
The basic idea is the same but taking back in the Group of 77 
project, it exceeds the simple estimate of a profit for 
searching for a finality of development notion singularly more 
extensive. "
Yet in the framework of the maritime Conferences Code of 
Conduct, this inequality and compensating claim very frequently 
invoked between states level in governmental Conferences, 
spreads out this initial plan so far as maritime industries 
constitute private activities in most of the countries.
So we must not be suprised at the declaration of developed 
States' spokesman in UNCTAD;
"All the coiintries, of this group consider that 
governments should not interfere ia the commercial and 
current activities of Conferences nor in their relations 
with shippers.
Their interference in matters, such as freight rates can
 ^ 2create conflicts between national interests."
1) Thuillier; "Maritime Transports and Roma Treaty", "Maritime 
Transport and EEC", RTDE, 1972, p. 272 ff.
2) Doc TC/l11/C4/SR6, p. k5
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P2 THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF RATIFICATION ON 
CONFERENCES
Some states are going to ratify the Code, others will not.
From that time, different problems can come up, creating con­
flicts between the national legislation and some conferences 
agreements.
Let us propose 2 theoretical examples:
1. Supposing that Senegal signs the Code of Conduct and
. Sweden is not a signatory, as it exists with the agreement of 
Senegal a Conference Senegal-Suede for the transport of 
phosphate. A Swedish Company not admitted by the Conference 
prosecute for "unfair competition" in front of the 
Swedish Courts of justice against the other Swedish com­
panies that she accuses to have participated in a manoeuvring 
order to exclude her from thb traffic Senegal-Sweden.
We suppose that the action is receivable before the 
Swedish Courts which would have a large conception of the 
unfair competition.
Can these Courts consider that the Code of Conduct justi­
fies the behaviour of the Swedish shipowners although 
Sweden didn't sign?
If judges declare that the Code is a "res inter alios 
acta" they give right to the demander and make in due 
time the Conference bu»st. This hypothesis has a theo­
retical character but is not inconceivablie.
2. Another hypothesis lifts up a second type of problem.
Let us suppose that in a Conference agreement we adopt 
disposition offered to the Code of Conduct, concerning 
a traffic between non-signatory States, Togo and Sweden 
for instance.
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Are shipowners from signatory States at fault by 
participating in some Conferences agreements opposed to 
the Code of Conduct?
In other words, do the regulations of the Code of Conduct 
constitute "personal obligations" as regards to shipowners 
from signatories countries to which they are in fault, or 
are they "real and geographical obligations" applying 
themselves to traffic at origin and, or, at destination 
to a signatory Country?
In this last case in our example, we can't blame shipowners 
because the Code of Conduct by hypothesis would not be 
applied to the concerned traffic.
Section 3
THE LIFTED PROBLEMS BY THE APPLICATION OF ARBITRATION
Although as we underlined it, some conflicts will implicate 
not only 2 but 3 parties: State, maritime Conference and 
Shipper.
The presented report in UNCTAD by the Working Group III of 
the preparatory Committee of the UN Conference for a Code of 
Conduct of maritime Conferences, preserves the classic sheme 
of the international arbitration through diverse variants:^
It seems in some way to take as a pattern the Convention 
for disputes settlement relating to investments betweenpStates and nationals from other countries.
For instance a conciliatory procedure later to the negotiation 
and consultation and former to the arbitration, is foreseen.
1) Doc. TD/C0DE/PC/w.g.IIl/c.3/ADD
2) Rideau: Bird Convention 18 March 1965. International Arbit­ration.
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On the other hand, the report foresees the creation of an 
Arbitrator Board the nomination of which is susceptible to 
2 variants:
Variant 1 ; each contractual State will designate the pfovern 
ments of the contractual parties, and the Govern 
ments of UNCTAD States members will designate 
the members to write on the Board.
Variant 2;The Board is established by the UN Secretary 
General on the basis of lists of experts pro- 
vided by the Contractual States.
Yet, two major differences separate Bird Convention from the 
actual report on the arbitration in the Code of Conduct.
On the one hand Art 25 of Bird Convention for disputes Settle­
ment relating to investments between States and Nationals from 
other States, limits the application of arbitration to the 
only juridical conflicts.
In the report on the Code of Conduct, the possibility claimed 
by the Group of 77 of an arbitration on a questior^ such as 
the appreciation of the increase of freight rates depending on 
their development, accounts for this divergence.
On the other hand Art 27 of Bird Convention suppresses the 
possibility of the diplomatic protection to the State the 
national of which is investing.
In the project of report on the Code of Conduct, the disposi-‘ 
tion is reversed in some way as Parag 72 proposed by developing 
countries disposes:
"The Governments of interested developing Countries will 
be allowed to participate fully to the procedures of 
arbitration the subjects of which will be Jthe disputes 
relating to freight rates, surtaxes and conditions of 
carrying products that these countries import."
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We understand the preoccupations to which this difference of 
conception answers to the Group of 77; In the first case the 
possibility of the diplomatic protection is refused to a in­
vesting state i.e. developed state. In the second case, the 
intervention of the State aspires to protect the interests 
of a developing country.
On the other hand, three specific problems are brought up by 
the application of arbitration. It concerns essentially;
- the appropriate law
- the granting power to the precedents
- the penalties of which the arbitration can be suited. 
PI THE APPROPRIATE LAW
The first article proposed by the Working Group III of the 
Preparatory Committee of Plenipotentiaries Conference in charge 
of elaborating a Code of Conduct "of Maritime Conferences 
disposes;^
1. The award is dispensing in conformity with the dis­
positions of the Code.
2. In case of silence of the Code on one point, court 
arbitrators apply;
Variant 1; The general principles of the International 
Law of Justice and Equity and the uses of 
the International Trade and shipping.
^« The Law that the parties have determined 
on a common agreement, or in default of 
such an agreement, the law that the Court, 
the arbitrator estimate to be the best 
appropriated in this particular cas®. In 
any case they take into account the uses 
of the trade.
l) Doc TD/C0DE/PC/W.G.III/L3/aDD
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pIt stands aut of a comparison of the two variants that:
- The first affirms in a clearer way the reference to the inter­
national law. Generally we know that the recourse to the 
General Principles of the Law constitute a clause of an 
internationalization of the arbitration.
- The second variant rather seems to refer to the contracting 
law, and in case of disagreement between the parties, the 
judges or the arbitrators have a large freddom to choose 
the appropriate law, without presiimptions in favour of the 
interhational law.
Developing countries are opposed to developed States, especially 
on the interpretation to give to the terms "Uses of Interna­
tional Trade and Shipping".
They agree to this utilization with reservations only according 
to a constant attitude also adopted in theif general contesta­
tion of the classical international law, on account of their 
non-participation to the elaboration of this last one.
In that respect and not only for protecting themselves against 
the trade's uses, but also for promoting their own needs, the 
Group of 77 requested the insertion in the Code of directional 
norms, so drawn up in the section A.1 and 2.^
A Objectives and Principles
1. The three basic and interdependent objectives of the Code 
are;the following:
a) To promote the regular expansion of the World Trade
generally, and particularly the GrowMi and the diver­
sification of developing countries' trade, so as to 
contribute to the settlement of an international 
division of a new and more equitable labour between
developed and developing countries.
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b) To promote a new structure of world maritime transport, 
compatible with this new frame of commercial exchanges 
in which the developing countries' merchant marine 
might play an important and increasing role.
c) To protect shippers' interests in developing countries 
particularly by setting up a balanced partition of 
rights and responsabilities between maritime trans­
ports' parties.
If we agree with these fundamental objectives, logically 
we are led to recognize among others, some basic prin'^ . 
ciples, offering a particular interest to developing 
dountries.
a) The principle according to which the freight rates
should be fixed to a compatible level with the comer- 
cial objectives of developing countries.
b) The principle according to which the maritme Confe­
rences should proceed to consultations with shippers, 
shippers organizations and interested governments, 
including those from non coastal countries, before 
making decisions which have repercussions on their 
interests.
c) The principle according to which the practices of 
maritime conferences should not induce any direct 
or indirect discrimination contrary to commercial 
and maritime interests of developing countries.
d) The principle according to which developing countries 
have absolutly the right to carry an important and 
increasing part of cargoes which come into their 
external trade and to ensure the full development
of their national merchant marine.
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e) The principle according to which developing countries 
maritime companies should be admitted on an equal 
footing in all the Conferences the activities of 
which present an interest for the trade of these 
countries.
f) The principle according to which developing countries 
have the right to protect and to develop their natio­
nal merchant marine and according to which the adop­
ted measures with this end in view should not be 
eonsidered discriminatory nor should it involve any 
reprisals.
g) The principle according to which public authorities 
have the right to fully exercise their power of con-- 
trol in scopes which arise from their competency
in order to ensure the application of the Code.
h) The principle accoi^ding to which the_. disputes con­
cerning the application of the Code which are not 
resolved by consultative way between maritime Comp- 
panies or between Conferences, shippers and shippers' 
organization, should be submitted to procedures 
determined in this Code.
Once again the cleavage between the conceptions on the object 
of the Code of Conduct appears; Developed States consider too 
general the objectives of the Group of 77» while for them, the 
Code is called only to regulate maritime Conferences.
On the contrary developing countries conceive the Code in a 
much larger perspective, as one of the instruments of their 
economical development.
P2 THE PROBLEM OF THE PRECEDENTS
5rThe standardization of the jurisprudence in the application 
of the Code is, of course, desirable,.but the appeal for pre­
cedents risks repercussions against particular difficulties
7l
on account of the importance of some considerations in most 
of the arbitration's award. Yet some motions have a juridical 
meaning, such as discrimination and can be the object of a 
jurisprudential definition.
How to ensure this standardization? Can we conceive to trust 
it to a.hig^er agent?
Concerning the arbitration between states which seems to be 
exceptional , it would be possible to conceive that the Con­
vention foresees a prejudicial recourse of the interpretation 
of the Code on the request of a state.
This recourse would be able to take the contentions form and 
arises from a clausis of the Convention basing the obligatory- 
competency of the Court on the basis of Article 36 parag. 2 
of its statute.
✓
The recent reform of the Courts' regulation would be suscep­
tible to facilitate and to accelerate the procedure. Article 
26 of this text gives to the parties a quasi—determinant part 
in nomination of 3 judges of the Chamber, foreseen by Article 
2k of the statute. This one had never been utilized until now, 
but we can think that this reform which introduces the arbit-r 
ration's philosophy in the Constitution of the Chamber in order 
to give to the Court the knowledge of some affairs, will be 
able to incite states to utilize this new disposition.^
However in our field, this procedure seems heavy. As for a 
request of a consultative judgement, the procedure would be 
more complex as much again, because it should be requested 
the UN Organization, in fact by its General Assembly, on the 
initiative of UNCTAD?
1) as in the case of a signatory state of the Convention on 
the Code of Conduct which adopts a regulation apposed to 
that one or exploits a public cooperation fleet or exercises 
a "diplomatic protection de facto" of his shipowners and 
shippers by meaning to defind his own interests.
2) Rideau: "The nature of the arbitral organ", p. 19-23
This decision is not the only open to criticism. It is also 
the case of the one which in the project of report affects the 
possible caneellation of the award.
P3 THE SANCTIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION
Two series of problems appear; on the one hand, the possibility 
to request the cancellation of the award and on the other hand 
its execution.
1. The possibility to request the cancellation of an award 
for irregularity in drafting or the obvious overpowering 
of the Court is foreseen by Article 52 of Birds' Con 
vention.
Such a request is submitted to a committee composed of 
members different from those of the Court and not having 
any ties with the interested-jjarties to the conflict.
On the contrary, the project report on article 1 III E 
decides that the award will be squashed, will not be exe­
cuted, or will not be recognized if the request adressed 
for that purpose by one of the parties to a competent 
Court of the country, where the recognition or the exe­
cution is requested, invokes one of the following.reasons:
— the Court neglected to statute on important points 
of the litigation, or committed an overpower, i.e. 
if the award carries on dispute non relating to
the compeninise or containing decisions which exceeds 
the terms of the compromise.
- the constitution of the arbitral Court where the 
procedure of arbitration was not conformable to 
the convention of parties to the disposition of 
the present code.
(This system is very shrinking with regard to the Bird system.)
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2, The penalties set a double problem: their determination 
in the arbitrator's award and their application in case 
of its non-execution,
a) In the arbitrator's award, a distinction can be 
made:
- If it is aboutaproppsition of modification of  ^
the maritime Conference's freight rates, the 
arbitrator will be able to declare it non confor­
mable to the Code, that will prevent it to be 
integrated to the tariff.
- If it concerns a decision taken by the maritime 
Conference, the penalty will consist in its can­
cellation, with eventually the obligation for the 
Conference to take one in a contrary way. It will 
be for instance, the admittance of one shipowner 
in the Conference which had been refused to him 
before.
b) In the case of non execution of the -arbitrator's 
award by the Conference, the State will pursue in 
front of its own Courts all the members of the mari­
time Conference, including foreigh shipowners.
This T^uestion of the arbitration of conflicts in the maritime 
Conferences is a very difficult subject, although the penal­
ties ace easier to apply on the national plan. It is on the 
international level that they are always very difficult.
But probably one day these cases of international arbitration 
would be regulated by first seeking what penalties can be a 
applied and then address the procedure of arbitration.
Indeed, it would be useless to have an award which nobody can 
apply on account that one country would find it contrary to 
its independence, as it recently happened in several arbitrations 
in USA, relating to one of the large Asian countries, which 
just as it was about to apply the judgment syys:
"I don't recognize this award, it violates rnyunitional 
independence and my integrity."
CONCLUSION
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The phenomenon of Conferences is essentially based on two 
freedoms, today criticezed and limited by any jurmdical system;
- On one side, the freedom of maritime traffics
- and on the other, the contractual freedom.
Freedoms which have been popular during the last century, when 
Conferences in fact started to assert their authority in the 
practice of maritime traffics, with the considerable increasing 
of exchanges, due to the success of the industrial revolution 
and to the technical progress developed in shipping.
Yet, their functioning and the scope of their agreements present 
certain differences. Some of them have an historical cause, 
others are due to the maritime route, the traffic and to the 
origin of participating companies tb the strength from which 
shippers or their organizations neggtiate with them, to their 
statutory regulation by the governments.
It is for these reasons that the maritime Conferences, fully 
enjoying these freedoms at the beginning of the nineteenth cen­
tury, could successfully satisfy to these exigencies, realizing 
a policy of agreements which at the same time protected the 
interests of the shipowners members facing outsiders and traffics
But we can go farther: In some Conference^ pool systems are 
organized, and in this framework, shipowners sometimes share 
out between them the freights according to quotas fixed in 
advance as it appears that a loyalty tie under one form or 
another should continue to exist for maintaining the services 
of regular liners facing the external competition.
So in spite of the criticisms which have been made to the 
Conferences' system, we can not help noticing that this one 
has promoted the rationalization of the liner maritime traffic 
by realizing among others:
7.
- the uniformity of tariff which allows to reduce the dif'H 
ferences existing between big and small shippers.
- the regularity and continuity of the service relating to 
the maritime traffic on the considered surface, including 
ports which because of their minor commercial interest, 
would be excluded of it otherwise.
- the convergency in the maritime sector of required in
> vestments for the renewal of the fleet thaiiks to the con­
tinuity and the regularty of its employment.
Then for these reasons, even when a more energetic public 
intervention in their functioning was wished, or when the 
nature or some abuse of their activity were criticised, the 
Conferences' indispensable role in order to ensure an effec­
tive march of the shipping liner, has always been whshed.
During these last decades, the lijie Conferences' countenance, 
their functions, their classic positions in the maritime trans­
ports, have changed deeply.
The Conferences' system at least, nationalized itself under 
the effect of the Cbde of Conduct. In a parallel direction, 
it suffers under a competition becoming sharper in a maritime 
world, where each state endeavours to become carrier; the deve­
lopment of the Soviet and Eastern Countries Commercial fleet, 
the competitiveness of which is not necessary to underline, 
the apparition of those from some new industrialized countries, 
strike harder at the European shipping, by eroding singularly 
the traffics they held.
The increasing public intervention in a private system results 
in the transformation of the nature of the institution and the 
diversification of the served interests: to the private interests 
of traditional shipowners, is added now those from states in a 
hard coexistence.
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